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Abstract   This article analyses rent-seeking behaviour among agents who com-
pete for high future shares of a common natural resource. Rent-seeking
behaviour occurs when the agents, based on earlier experience, expect that the
distribution of the common natural resource in the future will be dependent on
the agents’ activities in the past. We show that allocation rules that make rent
seeking individually rational, normally lead to scale inefficiency, input mix inef-
ficiency, and fewer participants in the industry than lump-sum allocation rules.
Key words   Natural resource, regulation, rent seeking.
Introduction
It is well known that a group of agents who share a common-pool resource will not
take account of the full social cost of their actions. This leads to the sub-optimal
management of the resource and a scenario popularly known as the tragedy of the
commons (Hardin 1968). A usual response to this problem is for a public body to
attempt to regulate extraction of the resource in some way in order to enforce opti-
mal management. Indirect regulation can be implemented through a system of taxes,
whilst direct regulation involves a quantity constraint on production (Bohm and
Russell 1985; Munro and Scott 1985). In this paper, we examine how rational ac-
tors’ expectations of a direct regulatory regime can affect its effectiveness. This type
of resource regulation implies a reduction in access for some or all of the actors in
the industry, or effective limits on production for the participants, according to some
pre-specified criterion. A fishery can, for example, be regulated by the use of quotas
which specify a total allowable catch (TAC) for a vessel (or crew). The size of the
quota is often based upon observable and verifiable variables, such as the length of
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the vessel and historic catch. These magnitudes can be freely chosen by the actors in
an unregulated (free) fishery.
When participants know (or suspect) that an industry will be directly regulated,
they, as a group, may have an incentive to seek to influence the design of the actual
regulation though lobbying campaigns. In addition to spending resources on collec-
tive and coordinated lobbying, the participants will have an incentive to adjust their
individual behaviour in anticipation of public interventions, even before regulation
is implemented. Such collective and individual behaviour, as a response from pri-
vate agents to public authorities’ regulating ambitions, has been termed “rent seek-
ing” in economic theory, since the seminal work of Krueger (1974). Let us pursue
the example of a fishery given above, and imagine that direct quota regulation will
be introduced. Then, different groups of fishermen might collectively fight for crite-
ria that will give them high shares of future catch quotas. Furthermore, if we assume
that quotas will be awarded to a certain extent on the basis of historic catch (defined
over a certain period), fishermen can then individually secure a larger quota ex post
by increasing the size of their catch in the periods leading up to the implementation
of regulation. The individual incentive to overfish in periods before implementation
of regulation is an example of rent-seeking behaviour which can counteract the effi-
ciency of the regulatory regime. It is precisely this mechanism that is the focus of
this paper.
We concentrate our analysis on three effects that individual rent seeking can
cause. The first is that firms in the industry choose an inefficient scale for their op-
eration in order to secure future resource rights (scale inefficiency). The second is
that rent seeking leads to a sub-optimal combination of inputs in the production pro-
cess (input-mix inefficiency). The third effect involves a reduction in the number of
firms in the industry compared to the number that would have participated if one
used a neutral quota sharing rule. Due to scale and input-mix inefficiency, firms’
short-term profit is reduced when they act upon their anticipation of regulation.
Those achieving a profit below that which represents the best alternative use of the
factors of production will disappear from the industry.
The model which we use to model the phenomenon of rent seeking in anticipa-
tion of regulation has a variety of applications; e.g., the extraction of a natural re-
source, the use of grazing land, or the emission of pollution. However, in order to
motivate the type of regulation that we consider in our model, we present evidence
from fisheries in the following section. Then, the model itself is presented and
analysed. Finally, conclusions are offered.
Direct Regulation of Fisheries
Fisheries provide a good example of direct quantity regulation. Our main thesis is
that the actors themselves can influence variables that govern the allocation of quo-
tas. In this section, we provide evidence of this from various fisheries. Grafton
(1996) examines the theory and international practice of individual transferable quo-
tas (ITQs). “In all ITQ programmes to date, fishers have received an allocation
gratis based upon an existing and/or historical participation in the fishery and/or
vessel characteristics.” New Zealand introduced a management system in 1983 for a
limited number of deepwater fish stocks, which was subsequently extended in 1986
to almost all remaining significant fish stocks. Again, past harvest weighed heavily
in the allocation of quotas. “Most ITQ’s were allocated to firms in proportion to past
harvest, although some quotas were sold to industry by tender” (Lindner, Cambell,
and Bevin 1992). An ITQ program for the wreckfish (Polyprion americanus) fishery
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participants weighted partially on catch history.” … “The initial allocation formula
divided 50 of the 100 available percentage shares in direct proportion to the
applicant’s documented catch over the 1987-1990 period. The remaining 50 shares
were divided equally among eligible applicants” (Gauvin, Ward, and Burgess 1994).
In the examples given above, it has been historic catch that has determined the
quota allocation. In the following cases, vessel characteristics also play a significant
role. In 1990, individual vessel quotas (IVQs) were introduced in the British Colum-
bia sablefish fishery. “The IVQs were assigned gratis to fishers on the basis of past
catches and vessel length, denominated as a proportion of the total allowable
catch,…” (Grafton 1995). According to Arnason (1993), the individual quota system
in the Icelandic fisheries was introduced to the herring fisheries in 1976, the capelin
fishery in 1980, and the demersal fisheries in 1984. Since 1990, all Icelandic fisher-
ies have been subject to a uniform system of ITQs. The quota allocation has de-
pended mainly on past harvest, but also on vessel capacity. “The initial allocation of
TAC-shares to individual vessels varies somewhat over fisheries. In demersal, lob-
ster and deep-sea shrimp fisheries the TAC-shares are normally based on the vessels’
historical catch record during certain base years.” …. “In the herring and inshore
shrimp fisheries the initial TAC-shares were equal. The same holds for the capelin
fishery except that 1/3 of the TAC-shares were initially allocated on the basis of ves-
sel hold capacity” (Arnason 1993).
One can also find several examples in Norwegian fisheries. The northeast Arctic
cod fishery (for vessels with traditional gear) was regulated in 1990 by a vessel
quota system mainly involving the allocation of quotas according to vessel size on
the 1st of January 1990, and catch in the period 1987–89 (Norwegian Directorate of
Fisheries 1990). The quota system has been applied to trawlers in this fishery since
1976; allocations here have also depended to some extent upon vessel size, with
large trawlers receiving a larger quota than smaller ones.
In 1999, access to the saithe fishery for those vessels using seine gear was re-
stricted according to previous participation and those who had fished sufficient quantity.
The participants have to satisfy three requirements. First, the owner and the vessel have
to be recorded in a public register. Second, the owner must have his own seine gear and
the vessel must have the necessary equipment to fish for saithe. Third, the vessel has to
have fished and not delivered less than 10 tons of saithe in at least one of the years
1996, 1997, or 1998 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 1999).1
Another example from Norway is the Greenland halibut fishery, which, after a
period of overfishing in the 1980s, was almost closed in 1991. In the years follow-
ing, trawlers were allowed a limited bycatch, and the coastal fleet has been permit-
ted to fish Greenland halibut for a very short, regulated time period. In spite of the
tight regulation, there has been a substantial total catch volume over the last years.
Marine researchers have, therefore, considered suggesting the implementation of a
quota system into this fishery.2 The Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association
argues that the distribution of these fishing rights should be based upon the historic
catch volume for a period before the original regulation was introduced in 1991
(Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association 1999).
We use these examples in order to motivate the variables upon which the quota
allocation can be based, and which actors themselves can influence. In the model
1 Evidence that this led to rent-seeking behaviour in this fishery is indicated by an article in the Norwe-
gian newspaper, Nordlys (9/6/99): “Many had expected the regulation of access. More actors partici-
pated in the saithe fishery using seine gear in order to secure access after the new rules were imple-
mented” (our translation).
2 Marine Researcher Olav R. Godø from the Norwegian Marine Research Institute to the newspaper
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described in the next section, we allow this allocation to depend (non-negatively)
upon past production and the size of a firm’s capital stock. The transition from a his-
torically open-access fishery to individual quota regulation has often taken place in
several stages. In order to regulate a fishery, open access may initially be prevented
by introducing licences (often given to the fishermen already participating in the
fisheries), or influenced by implementing maximal season lengths, gear restrictions,
and area closures.3 After this, the authorities may choose to implement individual
harvest quotas.4 In order to simplify our analysis, we consider an immediate transi-
tion from open access to individual, non-tradable quotas. Such a transition took
place in the northeast Arctic cod fishery for vessels with traditional gear. In this
fishery, there was no regulation of access before the system of vessel quotas was in-
troduced, and the fishermen were not allowed to buy or sell quotas. No matter how
the transition from open access to individual quotas is achieved, fishermen will have
an incentive to rent-seek as long as they suspect that their individual harvest quotas
will be based on factors that they can influence, such as historical performance
(measured by catch levels and/or input use).
The Model
We consider two periods. In the first, firms are unregulated, whilst direct regulation
is introduced at the beginning of the second period. To be specific, in period 1 firms
are free to choose whether they want to participate in exploiting the natural resource
or not. If they participate, they decide freely the level of economic activity in the
first period, but face a quantity constraint in the second via the introduction of a quota
scheme that limits the total amount of resource extraction. This total quota is known to
all firms at the beginning of the first period. Firms’ individual shares are decided by the
size of their capital stock (representing a commitment to produce) and their produc-
tion in period one.5 We assume that these allocations are non-tradable.6
Let us denote the number of operating participants in the industry by N. Further-
more, the production function of firm i = 1,.., N is assumed to be time invariant and
to depend upon labor, L, and capital, K:7
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where t = 1,2 is a time subscript, and y is the amount produced (or extracted). In
order to simplify the analysis, capital is assumed to be a fully flexible input, mean-
ing that there is no lag between a decision to expand capital and the presence of an
additional capital unit causing adjustment costs. Moreover, we normalise the prod-
uct price to 1, and can thus write firm i’s period 1 profit, π 1
i, as:
3 If such regulations are practised, Homans and Wilen (1997) use the term regulated open access to de-
scribe the institutional conditions under which the industry operates.
4 For instance, an analysis of the transition from limited entry to individual quotas is found in Weninger
and Just (1997).
5 In the fisheries example, capital can be thought of as vessel length.
6 The model and its qualitative results regarding rent seeking would not be affected if allocations are
tradable; in this case, the marginal profit from a small increase in the individual quota would be equal
for all firms (see equation 12). Hence, even though one might discuss how efficient a system of tradable
quotas actually is (see Boyce [1992] and Grafton [1996]), tradability will always be preferable to a re-
gime where it is illegal to buy and sell quotas.
7 In order to simplify the model, we have ignored that the size of the natural resource stock in the period
might influence the production technology described by the production function.Rent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 223
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where w is the wage rate, and c the price of capital. For simplicity, we also assume
that all prices are constant across time periods.
In period 2, the public authorities are supposed to introduce quota regulation
based on a maximum TAC in the regulated period, Y, which can be thought of as the
catch volume that maximizes the economic yield from exploiting the natural re-
source. Moreover, individual quotas,  yi
2, are supposed to be decided upon by the
size of firms’ capital stock and production in period 1:
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Here, gi is firm i’s share of the total quota, and y i
1
−  and K i
1
− are the first period pro-
duction and capital of all firms other than i. The share of firm i is increasing in its
own production and capital stock, and decreasing in those of other firms. Note the
dual role played by capital in the allocation rule in equation (3): an increase in capi-
tal affects the quota indirectly through increasing production, and also directly.
The problem facing firm i in period 2 is to maximize its profit:
π 22 2 2 2
ii i i i i FLK w L c K =− − (, ) (4)
by choice of Li
2, and K i
2 given the share constraint:
FLK y i N ii i i ( , ) , ..., 22 2 1 ≤∀ = . (5)
The Lagrangean for this problem is then:
H F L K wL cK F L K y i i ii i i i i ii i =− − − − [] (, ) (, ) 22 2 2 22 2 λ . (6)
The first-order conditions for a maximum are:




















where λ i is the increase in firm i’s profit from a small increase in its individual
quota. In cases where direct regulation represents a true constraint on the activity of
firm i, it will be the case that λ i > 0. We assume this to be the case so that equation
(5) holds as an equality.
The second period problem for the firm is to minimize the cost of producing its
allowed amount of the good in question. Equations (5) and (7) give 3N equations in
3N unknowns, which can be solved to yield:Bergland, Clark, and Pedersen 224
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Hence, the second period profit of firm i can be expressed as:
ππ 22 2
ii i yw c = (;,) . (9)
Having determined optimal actions in period two, we now consider the beginning of the
first period. The expected present value of firm i’s total profit over the two periods is:
V F L K wL cK g y K y K Y w c ii i i i i i i i i i i i i =+ = − − + []
−− πδ π δ π 12 1 1 112 1 1 1 1 (, ) (, , , ) ;, (10)
where δ  ≥  0 is a common discount factor.8 Recall that firms are not regulated in the
first period so that they can freely choose labor and capital to maximize equation
(10), given the factor choices of all other firms, the total quota for period 2,Y, and














































































































where Hi is the Lagrange function defined in equation (6). Using equation (12), we
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8 The value of the discount factor is dependent on the annual discount rate and the length of the regula-
tion period (or number of years the fishermen expect to be operating in the regulated industry). The less
the annual discount rate becomes and the longer the fishermen plan to participate in the regulated indus-
try (or the longer that firms operate), the higher the discount factor δ .Rent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 225
Economically efficient production in period 1 would require that the rate of techni-
cal substitution between capital and labor be equal to the ratio of the factor prices.
From equation (14) we see that firms’ rent-seeking behaviour can prevent this; we
have input-mix inefficiency. When the quota in the second period depends positively
on the capital stock from the first, too much capital is employed in relation to labor.9
Efficient production for firm i is ensured in the first period if the quantity constraint
for period 2 does not bind (λ i = 0), if actors do not value the future (δ  = 0), or if the
capital stock does not affect the period 2 quota directly [() ∂∂ gK ii
1  = 0].
The allocation rule we considered in equation (3) depends directly on only one
of the factors of production. However, input mix inefficiency would also result
(apart from under very special circumstances) if the future quota depends upon both
factors. To see this, consider an extended quota allocation rule:
yg y K L y K L Y i N ii i i i i i i
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 =∀ = −− − ( , , , , , ) , , .., (3′ )
where, in addition to the properties of equation (3), () , ( ) ∂∂ ≥ ∂∂ ≤ − gL gL ii i i
11 00 .







































The right-hand side of this equation is only equal to the ratio of the factor prices (w/c),


















measured at the firm’s optimal choice. In other cases, the input mix is inefficient.
A second effect of this rent-seeking behaviour is that the scale of production in








































9 An input mix inefficiency result is also found in the general theory of public regulation (see the semi-
nal work of Averch and Johnson 1962). However, the excessive capital-labor ratio chosen by a regulated
monopoly in the Averch-Johnson model is caused by a public rate-of-return constraint, while the input
mix inefficiency in our model can be explained as a result of the competition between the firms in
searching for high shares of future quotas.Bergland, Clark, and Pedersen 226
where the expression on the left-hand side is the marginal profit from production in
period 1. The first term in this expression represents the gain in period 1 from pro-
ducing an extra unit, whilst the second is the present value of this extra production
in period 2, which originates from an increase in firm i’s quota. The term in the cen-
tre and to the right in equation (15) is the marginal cost of increasing period 1 pro-
duction by one unit by employing more labor and capital, respectively. If capital is a
normal (non-inferior) factor, it is immediately apparent from equation (15) that the
firm employs more capital than it would without the impending implementation of
direct regulation, because both the scale and substitution effects are positive.
Whether the firm employs more or less labor (if labor also is a normal factor) in the
rent seeking case than in the free competition case, however, depends on whether
the positive scale effect dominates the negative substitution effect on labor. Finally,
it should be remarked that there is no scale effect if the quota in period 2 is indepen-
dent of  ygy iii
11 0 () ∂∂= . The findings so far are summarized in result 1:
Result 1: Rent seeking as a response to impending regulation can have two
effects on firms participating in the exploitation of the natural resource. An
inefficient scale is chosen if future production quotas depend positively on
current production. Additionally, the input mix will be inefficient if future
quotas depend directly upon the employment of factors of production.
In addition to the two effects in result 1, it is conceivable that participating firms’
reaction to impending regulation can reduce the actual number of participants in the
industry compared to the numbers of firms which would have chosen to participate
if no rent seeking was undertaken. The thought here is that rent-seeking behaviour
leads to scale and input-mix inefficiency which reduce firms’ net present values. If
this net present value is sufficiently reduced, then the firm will exit the market. To
examine this effect, we will now simplify the analysis further by assuming that all
firms are identical. In relation to the model, this means that they have a common
production function FL K t
i
t
i (, ) , i = 1, …, N, t = 1,2 . We focus on the symmetric
equilibrium in which all firms take the same actions. Using the quota allocation rule
in equation (3), one can determine the profit of one of the firms in the second period
of a symmetric equilibrium as π 2{ y2[F(L1, K1), K1, N, Y], w, c}. The present value of
a firm’s two-period profit can thus be written as:
V F L K wL cK y F L K K N Y w c =− − + [] {} (, ) (, ) , ,, ,,. 11 1 1 2 2 11 1 δπ (16)
Maximizing V with respect to L1 and K1 means that the first-order conditions in



























where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier on the firms’ second period production constraint.10
In order to determine the number of agents endogenously, we introduce a mini-
mum net present value condition:
VQ ≥ (18)
10 The second-order condition is given in the Appendix.Rent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 227
Q ≥  0 is supposed to be an exogenously determined minimum level of the net
present value. We may think of Q as the net present value the firms would earn by
the best alternative use of their initial resources. The maximum number of partici-
pating firms in the rent-seeking equilibrium when assuming open access to the in-
dustry is then endogenously determined by equation (18), interpreted as an equality
at the same time as the conditions in equation (17) are satisfied.
As a benchmark, let us assume that public authority consider direct regulation
which does not give rise to any rent-seeking behaviour (denote this case NRS). In
order to achieve this, we may think of a situation where the public authorities distribute
future quotas to all firms that choose to participate in period 1, but where past individual
behavior does not count; i.e., [∂ g/∂ y1 = ∂ g/∂ K1 = 0]. For instance, such a neutral al-
location rule (or lump-sum distribution of quotas) might be implemented by divid-
ing the total quota equally among the N participating actors in period 1, no matter
what their catches or capital investments were in that period. In this case, the opti-
mal choice of inputs in period 1 is characterised by the condition that marginal prof-
its in this period be equal to zero (∂π 1/∂ L1 = ∂π 1/∂ K1 = 0). Denoting these optimal
factor levels as LNRS
1  and K NRS
1 , the net present value of a firm’s profit will be:
V F L K wL cK
Y
N






 (, ) 11 1 1 2 2 δ (19)
where L2 and K2 represent the least cost levels of producing the quota in period 2.
The maximum number of participants in this case is found when VNRS = Q. Denote
this by NNRS.
Now consider what happens in the case of rent seeking (RS), but assume that
there are NNRS participants. It can be seen from equation (17) that marginal profits in
period 1 will be negative (∂π 1/∂ L1 < 0, ∂π 1/∂ K1 < 0). However, since the equilibrium
on which we focus is symmetric, the quota in period 2 will be Y/NNRS; i.e., the same
quota as in case NRS. Comparing these cases, more resources are used to secure an
identical quota when there is rent seeking; hence, the net present value of profit
must fall below Q when NNRS actors rent seek. In order to achieve the profit con-
straint in equation (18), the number of participants must be reduced below NNRS
when rent seeking is possible. Hence, an industry in which rent seeking occurs
would be expected to have fewer participants than one where rent seeking is indi-
vidually irrational. This result is stated below:
Result 2: The number of participating firms is lower when the quota allocation
rule leads to a rent-seeking mechanism (RS) compared to a situation where
a neutral allocation is practised and, therefore, no rent seeking takes place.
This result is illustrated in figure 1, where the relationship is depicted between
the present value of two-period profit (V) and the number of participating firms in
the RS and NRS cases, ceteris paribus. The maximum number of firms in the two
cases is determined where the falling V-curves cross the profit constraint, implying
that each firm earns exactly Q in equilibrium. Earning above this level would give
an incentive to other firms to enter the industry at the beginning of the first period.
If expected earnings are below Q, then firms would exit the industry. Given that the
V-curve in the NRS case lies above the V-curve in the RS case, it is seen that the
number of participants is higher in NRS than in the RS case.
Before we proceed with our analysis, result 2 deserves some comment. Even
though a lump-sum distribution of future rights to the natural resource means higher
participation than allocation rules that make it advantageous for firms to rent seek, itBergland, Clark, and Pedersen 228
is not clear whether a continued, unregulated industry would give a lower or higher
number of participating firms than cases where regulation is implemented. Future quota
regulation can cause more or fewer participants in the industry than a continued, unregu-
lated fully open-access fishery.11 In order to see why, let us now take into account the
possible effects following from changes in the stock of the natural resource from one pe-
riod to the other. Suppose that the periods leading up to quota regulations are
characterised by overfishing and a substantial decline in the stock of the natural re-
source. This implies relatively low marginal productivity for the inputs used, and there-
fore, relatively low resource rent in the industry. Hence, if no regulation is expected to
be introduced, the number of firms finding it advantageous to operate might be rela-
tively low. However, if the actors believe that quota regulation is going to be imple-
mented in the near future, bringing the future total production down and the stock size
upwards, the marginal productivity of inputs will increase. Comparing these two sce-
narios, there will be at least two relevant effects influencing the number of operating
firms. First, there will be a negative direct effect on the number of firms due to the re-
duction in total harvest compared to the scenario where no regulation is introduced. Sec-
ond, there will be a positive indirect effect on the number of participants stemming from
higher marginal productivity of the input caused by the increase in stock size. Empiri-
cally, it is often found that implementing individual quotas based on historical produc-
tion leads to an increase in industry participation, implying that the indirect positive ef-
fect dominates the direct negative effect. For instance, this seems to be the evidence
from the Canadian and US Pacific halibut fisheries (Munro and Scott 1985; Stollery
1986; Homans and Wilen 1997) and in the Norwegian saithe fishery (see footnote 1).
Figure 1. Optimal Number of Participants in the RS and NRS Cases
11 We are grateful to the journal’s reviewers for making us aware of this point.Rent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 229
Returning to our model, it is also interesting to know how changes in the total al-
lowed quota, discount factor, factor prices, and minimum present value of profit will in-
fluence the number of participating firms in our rent-seeking model. Based on an analy-
sis of partial changes in these variables (given in the appendix), we state our third result:
Result 3: The number of participants who compete for quota shares in the
future of a common natural resource is increasing in the total allowed quota
(Y) and the discount factor (δ ), and is decreasing in factor prices (w and c)
and the minimum present value of profit (Q).
The intuition behind these conclusions is quite simple. If firms accept lower
earnings from their activity (Q falls), the number of participants who are able to
reach this minimum will increase. If the total allowed quota increases (Y increases),
the future advantage of obtaining a higher individual quota increases, which gives
an incentive for new firms to enter the industry. As the discount factor rises (δ  in-
creases), future incomes count more, strengthening the incentives for new firms to
enter the industry. However, when factor prices increase (w and/or c rise), there will
be fewer active firms because the individual profits in both periods fall.
An increase in the total allowable quota, Y, or an increase in the discount factor,
δ , is illustrated in figure 2, which is constructed in the same way as figure 1. If Y or
δ  increase, the V-curve shifts up from v0 to v1, and the number of participants in-
creases. Correspondingly, higher factor prices shift the V-curve down, leading to
fewer participants; a higher minimum present value of profit would shift up the Q-
curve, which also reduces the number of active firms.
Figure 2. Impact on the Number of Participants from a Marginal Increase in
TAC, Increase in the Discount Factor, or Decreases in Factor PricesBergland, Clark, and Pedersen 230
Conclusion
We have documented that several fishing industries around the world have been
regulated by public authorities by determining TACs for different fish stocks. Fur-
thermore, the total quota is often distributed to active firms based on actual choices
of individual catches and inputs in the past. Based on a simple model in which the
agents know this allocation mechanism, we have seen that it is individually advanta-
geous for agents to attempt to influence the allocation through rent-seeking
behaviour. The effects of the behaviour can be inefficient scale and inefficient input
mix choices (result 1). Furthermore, we have seen that an allocation rule that in-
duces rent seeking leads to fewer active firms than a neutral allocation rule where
the authorities share the common natural resource without taking into account ac-
tual, past individual behaviour (result 2). We have also shown that the number of
participants in the industry is increasing in total quota size and the discount factor,
and decreasing in factor prices and the minimum present value required by the firms
(result 3).
As mentioned above, our conclusions are based on a model where we have
made several simplifying assumptions. The two most critical assumptions deserve
comment. We have assumed that the firms have perfect information about the future
total quota (Y), the actual quota allocation rule chosen by the public authority, and
the exact point of time when regulation is implemented. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, different groups of firms in the industry will have an incentive to spend re-
sources in lobbying campaigns to secure their positions when future rights to the
natural resource are going to be distributed. This leads to uncertainty as to what kind
of distribution rule will finally be implemented, bringing uncertainty also to the fu-
ture gains from rent seeking. This would very possibly lead to less rent seeking
compared to a situation where relevant information concerning the future public
regulation was known. For instance, suppose that the firms believe that the final so-
lution is that the authorities share the total allowable quota in the future on indi-
vidual average production and individual average levels of inputs, estimated on the
basis of statistics for some unknown years in the past. Then, the firms’ current abil-
ity to influence future individual quotas is weakened, and the possible advantage of
rent seeking for a single year is reduced. Secondly, in our modelling we have ig-
nored the dynamics of the renewable natural resource. This means that we have ig-
nored that high total harvest in one period might reduce future growth in the natural
stock or, in extreme cases, the stock of the natural resource as well. For instance, if
rent seeking leads to a high total extraction in the first period, this may induce the
public authorities to choose a low total allowable quota in the regulated period. If
the firms are aware of this, they may behave less aggressively than in a situation
where no such feedback mechanism exists. The reason is obvious. There will be a
lower total quota to be shared by the participants, and, therefore, the possible gains
from rent seeking will be reduced. Again, this is a mechanism which may weaken
rent-seeking incentives.
Even though our analysis is based on several simplifying assumptions, and on
others than explicitly commented on above, we believe that this paper points to an
important issue that occurs in the practical regulation of common natural resources.
The theoretical findings point out the problems of overutilization and overcapacity
often found within industries based on common natural resources, and also when a
public authority wants to implement quantitative regulations. However, further theo-
retical research concerning the type and size of possible rent-seeking mechanisms is
necessary, as are empirical studies from different common natural resources.Rent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 231
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Appendix
In this appendix, we prove result 3. The second order condition for a profit maxi-
mum of equation (17) is:



















































































































































































































Assuming that equation (18) in the text holds as an equality, we can totally differen-
tiate this expression using equation (16) to obtain:
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22
22 2 0.













dY L L dw
22
12 ()  (A4)
−+ + −= () K K dc d dQ 22 2 0 δπ δRent Seeking and the Regulation of a Natural Resource 233
























































































at the symmetric equilibrium.
Result 3 can now be seen directly from equation (A5).